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NOTES
The Availability of Judicial Review for the
Government Contractor
On May 14, 1956, the appellant entered into a contract with the gov-
ernment to manufacture felt canteen covers. Specimens of the covers
tested by the government were found to be substandard, and the govern-
ment agreed to accept the contract at a small price reduction.' Five years:
after the acceptance of the contract the appellant discovered that the
government had tested the covers improperly. In accordance with the
"disputes" clause' the appellant filed a claim with the contracting officer
demanding (1) a refund of the price reduction and (2) an equitable
adjustment for alleged increased costs of production. Both the contracting
officer and the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA)
denied the claim. After exhausting the available administrative remedies
the appellant filed suit in the Court of Claims six years and five months
after the completion of the contract. The Court of Claims held that the
appellant's claim was barred by the six year statute of limitations of
the Tucker Act.'
The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed, concluding that the
cause of action first accrued no later than the date of final delivery of
the disputed canteen covers, and that the statute of limitations was not
tolled by the administrative hearings.' Because there was a conflict between
the Second Circuit and the Third Circuit,' the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Held, reversed and remanded: If a claim filed by the contractor
is a claim "arising under" the contract and therefore subject to adminis-
trative determination, his right to bring a civil action first accrues when
the ASBCA finally rules on his claim. Crown Coat Front, Inc. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 503 (1966).
' The test the government used was set forth in the contract. The price modification agreed to
was $.005 less per unit-a total of $270.01.
The "disputes" clause common to all government contracts is as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a question
of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be de-
cided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and mail
or otherwise furnish a copy to the Contractor. Within 30 days from the date of
receipt of such copy, the Contractor may appeal by mailing or otherwise furnishing
to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Secretary or his duly
authorized representative for the hearing of such appeals shall, unless determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or
so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, be final and conclusive; pro-
vided that if no such appeal is taken, the decision of the Contracting Officer shall be
final and conclusive. In connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the
Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in
support of its appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor
shall proceed diligently and in accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision.
32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12, § 597.103-12 (1966).
aCrown Coat Front, Inc. v. United States, 292 F.2d 290 (Ct. Cl. 1961), aff'd, 363 F.2d 407
(2d Cir. 1966), rev'd and remanded, 386 U.S. 503 (1967).
4 Crown Coat Front, Inc. v. United States, 363 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1966), rev'd and remanded,
386 U.S. 503 (1967).
' Northern Metal Co. v. United States, 350 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1965) (the statute of limita-
tions is tolled uring tle pending administrative proceedings).
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Government Contract Procedure The bulk of the federal government's
procurement of supplies and services is controlled by two regulations-
The Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) and the Federal
Procurement Regulations (FPR). The ASPR applies to all purchases and
contracts made by the Department of Defense. A contracting officer,
selected by the department head, is authorized to enter into contracts for
supplies and services on behalf of the government. He is also authorized,
pursuant to the changes clause found in all standard and customary gov-
ernment procurement contracts, to issue change orders concerning any
modification in an existing contract which he feels is necessary.' The con-
tractor is entitled to an equitable adjustment if the changes require an
increased cost in production.
Through the standard "disputes" clause any dispute concerning a ques-
tion of fact arising under the contract is to be resolved by a decision of
the contracting officer.7 A dispute may arise, for example, from the par-
ties' inability to agree on the amount of an adjustment price. An actual
breach of contract or failure of the government to perform any of its
express obligations is outside the scope of the contract, and no remedy
for such breach is provided in the contract itself.' The contractor may
appeal the decision of the contracting officer after final determination by
that officer' or upon failure of the officer to act. ° The contractor has
thirty days to appeal the contracting officer's decision to the ASBCA."
Judicial review will be granted only after the procedure of the particular
The changes clause is as follows:
The Contracting Officer may at any time, by a written order, and without notice
to the sureties, make changes, within the general scope of this contract, in any one
or more of the following: (i) drawings, designs or specifications, where the supplies
to be furnished are to be specially manufactured for the Government in accordance
therewith; (ii) method of shipment or packing; and (iii) place of delivery. If any
such change causes an increase in the cost of, or the time required for, performance
of this contract, an equitable adjustment shall be made in the contract price or
delivery schedule, or both, and the contract shall be modified in writing accordingly.
Any claim by the Contractor for adjustment under this clause must be asserted
within 30 days from the date of receipt by the Contractor of the notification of
change: Provided, however, That the Contracting Officer, if he decides that the facts
justify such action, may receive and act upon this contract. Failure to agree to any
adjustment shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the meaning of
the clause of this contract entitled "Disputes". However, nothing in this clause
shall excuse the Contractor from proceeding with the contract as changed.
32 C.F.R. § 7.103.2 (1966).
Ripley v. United States, 223 U.S. 695 (1911); Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878);
Edwards v. United States, 163 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1947).
'Nagler Elec. v. United States, 368 F.2d 847 (Ct.CI. 1966). See also Morrison, Knudson
Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 833 (Ct.CI. 1965); Tertleing v. United States, 334 F.2d 250 (Ct.Cl.
1964); Specialty Assembly & Packing Co. v. United States, 298 F.2d 794 (Ct.C. 1962);
Cosmopolitan Mfg. Co. v. United States, 297 F.2d 546 (Ct.CI. 1962); Holton, Seeyle & Co. v.
United States, 65 F. Supp. 903 (Ct.CI. 1946); Austine Eng'r Co. v. United States, 88 Ct.CI.
43 (1939). Cases which have held that the cause of action accrues when the administrative hearings
are final are: Electric Boat v. United States, 297 U.S. 710 (1935); Clifton Prods., Inc. v. United
States, 169 F. Supp. 511 (Ct.Cl. 1959); Art Center School v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 916
(Ct.Cl. 1956); Griffin v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 197 (Ct.CI. 1948).
'Before the decision of the contracting officer becomes final it must be clearly communicated
to the contractor. See Brister & Loester Lumber Corp. v. United States, 188 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
'
0 Brister & Loester Corp. v. United States, 188 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
" See note 2 supra.
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administrative agency has been followed." Pending a decision of the
administrative hearing the contractor is required to do the work according
to the contract until completion.
The authority of the contracting officer and the appeals board to render
final decisions is limited to questions of fact." The contracting officer
can decide questions of law where the determination is necessary in decid-
ing the questions of fact, but the determination is not final as to any
judicial hearing.14 If a claim is found by the officer to involve only a ques-
tion of law, the contractor can go directly to a court of law. In such cases
the officer has the responsibility to determine the government's position
on the law and the evidence.
Restrictive Nature of Government Contract Suits The ancient common
law maxim "the king can do no wrong" prevented suits being brought
against the federal government until the creation of the United States
Court of Claims in 18 5 5. Prior to this date claims against the government
had to be settled by Congress. The Tucker Act, which was enacted in
1885, sets forth the claims which may be litigated, and imposes a six-year
time limit for filing such claims.1 It is now the basis of all contract
claims, including both express and implied contracts, against the govern-
ment in the district court and the Court of Claims."
"E.g., United States v. Hcdpuch, 328 U.S. 234 (1946); United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730
(1944); United States v. Peter Kiewitt Son's Co., 345 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1965); Allied Paint &
Color Works v. United States, 309 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1962); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v.
United States, 345 F.2d 833 (Ct.Cl. 1965); Henry E. Wylie Co. v. United States, 169 F. Supp.
249 (Ct.Cl. 1959).
'3 Jurisdiction of the board of appeals is limited in part to matters such as application of con-
tract terms to equitable adjustments pursuant to the changes clause, determination of the existence
of a changed condition when relief is provided in the contract, and provision for proper terms
under which a termination settlement should be allowed. Boards are empowered to take and hear
evidence and make findings of fact concerning such breaches of contract even though they lack
the authority to express an opinion. The boards will take evidence necessary for them to determine
whether the matter before them falls under their jurisdiction and will not refuse to bear the matter
if it is a breach. See note 8 supra and note 14 infra. See also Huntington Steel Corp. v. United
States, 153 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Atlantic Carriers Inc. v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Wessel Duval & Co., 115 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
14See T.D. & S. Constr. Co. (1964) I.B.C.A. No. 401, 1964 B.C.A. No. 4154; Peter
Kiewitt Son's Co. (1964) I.B.C.A. No. 405, 1964 B.C.A. No. 4141; Thomas King Martin (1963)
A.S.B.C.A. No. 8181, 1963 B.C.A. No. 3732.
"5 The Tucker Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)
was entitled "An Act to provide for the bringing of suits against the Government of the United
States." Presently it reads:
§ 1346. United States as defendant.
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court
of Claims, of;
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000
in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any
regulation of an executive department or upon express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1966).
§ 2401. Time for commencing action against the United States.
(a) Every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless
the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues. The
action of any person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim
accrues may be commenced within three years after the disability ceases.
28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1966).
16 See note 15 supra. The act does not confer jurisdiction upon the court to hear tort claims,
and special jurisdictional problems involving maritime contracts or disputes are governed by the
Suits in Admiralty Act. 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1966). The act confers jurisdiction upon the Court of
Claims to hear and dispose of claims without limitation as to amount, while it limits the jurisdiction
of the district courts to under $19,000.
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The "disputes" clause in government contracts declares that the parties
to a contract agree that a decision of the ASBCA will be final and con-
clusive. Review of this decision will be granted only under certain cir-
cumstances. In 1951 in United States v. Wunderlich," the Supreme Court
limited the scope of judicial review to fraud. The Wunderlich Act," re-
sulting from that decision, expanded the scope to allow review when (1)
the decision was fraudently determined or arbitrarily or capriciously made,
(2) was so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith in its
rendition, or (3) unless it was not supported by substantial evidence.
Apart from questions of fraud, determination of finality of questions of
fact rests upon the consideration of the record before the department. 9
The Statute of Limitations: A Seventy Year Old Problem In an action
arising under the "disputes" clause of a contract"0 or where there is a
breach,2' a number of alternatives are present for determining when the
cause of action accrues for limitation purposes." In the past it was main-
tained that the cause of action accrued at the time of the actual breach.
Support for this alternative was mainly the Supreme Court decision in
McMahon v. United States," a case, arising under the Suits in Admiralty
Act and not under the Tucker Act, which held that the cause of action
begins at the time of the seaman's injury. The second alternative was that
the cause of action accrued, at the latest, at the completion or acceptance
of the contract, the position maintained by the Second Circuit in Crown
17342 U.S. 98 (1951).
'
5 Wunderlich Act of May 11, 1954, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1965).
" The Supreme Court has recently set some rigid standards for the courts to follow in con-
sideration of the administrative record. In United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709
(1963), the Court said that apart from questions of fraud, the scope of review of agency decisions
is limited by a decision of whether the decision of the board was fraudulent, capricious or clearly
erroneous as shown in the record of the board. In United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, 384
U.S. 424 (1966), the Court said that the Court of Claims must return matters to the board
for findings of fact, when the board had erroneously dismissed the matter on a procedural point
without taking evidence on the questions of fact. In United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining
Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), the Court held that the determination by the board of appeals of fact
questions is binding on the courts in separate proceedings based upon breach even though the board
had no jurisdiction over the breach. These rulings overturned the Court of Claims position that it
had the right to try questions of fact at trial de novo.
2o See note 2 supra.
21 It is settled that when all events have occurred to fix the government's liability a cause of
action accrues entitling the claimant to demand payment and to sue for the money. See Sauer v.
United States, 354 F.2d 302 (Ct.CI. 1965); Oceanic S.S. v. United States, 165 Ct.CI. 217 (1964);
Fattore v. United States, 312 F.2d 797 (Ct.CI. 1963); Cosmopolitan Mfg. Co. v. United States,
297 F.2d 546 (Ct.CI. 1962); Empire Inst. of Tailoring v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 409 (Ct.CI.
1958); Ball v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 740, (Ct.CI. 1956); Group v. United States, 125
Ct.Cl. 135 (1953); Reliance Motors, Inc. v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 228 (Ct.Cl. 1948); Withers
v. United States, 69 Ct.CI. 584 (1930).
1See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947);
Holton, Seeyle & Co. v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 903 (Ct.CI. 1946); Joplin v. United States,
89 Ct.CI. 345 (1939); Myerle v. United States, 31 Ct.CI. 105 (1896). Note that where a con-
tract has no relevant "disputes" clause, the statute of limitations begins to run with the com-
pletion or the acceptance of the contract. See Mulholland v. United States, 361 F.2d 237 (Ct.C1.
1966); Specialty Assembly & Packing Co. v. United States, 298 F.2d 794 (Ct.CI. 1962); B-W
Constr. Co. v. United States, 100 Ct.CI. 227 (1943); Pink v. United States, 85 Ct.Cl. 121, cert.
denied, 303 U.S. 642 (1938).
"'McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25 (1951), overruling Thurston v. United States, 179
F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1950). See also United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); United States
v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); United States v. Michel, 282 U.S. 656 (1931).
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Coat.4 In addition it was maintained that the cause of action accrued at
the completion of the contract but that the statute of limitations was
tolled during the pending administrative hearings, the position followed
by the Third Circuit."s Finally the Court of Claims has held that the
statute begins to run at the end of the administrative hearings since this
is the only time when the contractor is aware of his injury to the fullest
extent.2
Conflicting purposes pervade any selection among the alternatives. At
some time a defendant ought to be secure that old claims cannot be raised,
and he ought not to be called to resist a claim when evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, or witnesses have disappeared. On the other
hand this policy seems outweighed by the concern for justice when a
plaintiff would suffer injury through no fault of his own.
Most statutes of limitations are only procedural, i.e., the claim is un-
enforceable but is not extinguished after the statutory period has run.
In such situations equitable considerations may decide the outcome. Courts
have engrafted numerous exceptions; e.g., where there has been fraud,8
or where an injury is discovered after the statute has run,"' or where the
injury is caused by a slow and continuing process, ° or where principles
of estoppel prevent the defendant from raising the defense of the time
bar."1 On the other hand, the statute of limitations of the Tucker Act is
jurisdictional. Thus the claim is extinguished."2 The Second Circuit in
discussing the jurisdictional aspect stated,
"... where a statute creates a cause of action which was unknown at common
law the period of limitation set up in the same statute is regarded as a matter
of substance, limiting the right as well as the remedy. Filing a complaint
within the prescribed period is a condition precedent to recovery, and the
cause of action is extinguished after the running of the period."'
The Supreme Court Opinion in Crown Coat The opinion of the Court,
delivered by Mr. Justice White, settled many of the problems which re-
sulted from the conflict among the circuits. The Court stated that if the
2 4 Crown Coat Front, Inc. v. United States, 363 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Un-
excelled Chem. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59 (1953); Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33
(1926); Isthmian S.S. Co. v. United States, 302 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1962); States Marine Corp. v.
United States, 283 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1960); Leonick v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 F.2d
48 (2d Cir. 1958); Maclnnes v. United States, 189 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1951); Gregory v. United
States, 187 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1951); Sgambati v. United States, 172 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1949);
Burch v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Va. 1958); Finley v. United States, 147 F. Supp.
184 (D.N.J. 1956); Atlantic Carriers v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Pacific-
Atlantic S.S. Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 931 (D.Del. 1955); Wessel, Duval & Co.
V. United States; 126 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
" Northern Metal Co. v. United States, 350 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1965).
2'Nagler Elec. v. United States, 368 F.2d 847 (Ct.CI. 1966).2
1 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944).
28Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959); Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S.
342 (1874).
2 Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
"
0 Daniels v. Beryllium Corp., 227 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Penn. 1964).
31 See Developments in the Law-Statute of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1233 (1950).
2Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957); United States v. Wardwell, 172 U.S. 48
(1898); United States v. Greathouse, 166 U.S. 601 (1897); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227
(1887). See also Fattore v. United States, 312 F.2d 797 (Ct.CI. 1963).
aOsbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1947).
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action arose under the contract (thus through the "disputes" clause) the
action did not accrue until final determination by the ASBCA. Only then
does the claim become subject to adjudication by the courts, and pro-
tracted administrative proceedings may last six years beyond the com-
pletion of the contract. The Court noted that in enacting the Wunderlich
Act Congress proposed to insure adequate judicial review of administrative
decisions on claims arising under government contracts.' The Court dis-
counted the use of the protective suit, since the contractor cannot ask a
court to review a decision before it has been made; nor can he make the
proper allegations before the hearings are final. Only when it is alleged
and proved that the administrative determination was arbitrary, capricious
or not supported by the evidence may a court refuse to honor the ad-
ministrative decision. Until the decision is made the contractor cannot
know what claim he has or on what grounds the administrative action
may be vulnerable.
The Court distinguished cases brought under the Suits in Admiralty
Act and previously used as authority in Tucker Act cases.' The Suits in
Admiralty Act requires the claim to be brought within two years after
the cause of action accrues. The Clarification Act' brought such claims
as the seaman's injury in McMahon and those claims in the cases decided
by the Second and Third Circuits under the Suits in Admiralty Act and
permits no court action unless the suit is administratively disallowed.
The limitation period on such claims runs from the time of the injury
since there is no reasonable time period limitation for the claimant to
bring his action. If the period was postponed as it is under the Tucker
Act the claimant would be able to postpone indefinitely the commence-
ment of the limitation period. Another distinguishing factor between the
Admiralty Act and the Tucker Act is that under the Admiralty Act the
claimant may proceed directly to court if his claim has not been rejected
within 60 days. Thus there is no chance for administrative action to con-
sume the entire limitation period and therefore bar all resort to the courts.
The cases relied upon by the Second Circuit in Crown Coat were based
upon the Suits in Admiralty Act and in actuality have no valid effect upon
contract claims brought under the Tucker Act.
Conclusion The Supreme Court in Crown Coat has cleared up a seventy
year old problem. The Court interpreted the Tucker Act limitation period
to run from the end of the administrative hearings. The contractor now
knows that when he has a cause of action "arising under" the contract,
he must follow the administrative procedure before he files his suit.
For limitation purposes the cause of action accrues after the administra-
tive hearings are final. Thus a contractor will have six years to file suit.
The length of time in such a situation is not important since the record
of the administrative body will be preserved and used by the court. But
34 See note 19 supra.
3s46 U.S.C. § 745 (1966); See also note 15 supra.
"' 50 U.S.C. S 1291 (a) (1965).
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the Court left open an important question. Where there is a breach of
contract and questions of fact which must be decided by the administra-
tive body, when does the cause of action accrue? The lower courts have
held that the contractor should bring his claim in one suit; thus Crown
Coat would also control in this instance. It remains to be seen whether this
position will be upheld by the Court in future decisions.
Lawrence J. Brannian
Binding Effect of State Court Judgment in Federal Tax Cases
I.
The decedent Herman Bosch set up a revocable trust to pay income
to his wife during her lifetime. In 19 51, on the advice of her attorney and
to avoid future adverse tax consequences, Mrs. Bosch executed an instru-
ment which attempted to release her general testamentary power of ap-
pointment for the trust, converting it to a special power which would
not be taxable to her estate upon her death.1 When Herman Bosch died,
his executor claimed the value of the trust as a marital deduction,' thus
reducing the estate tax paid.' The Commissioner of Internal Revenue de-
termined that the trust did not qualify for the marital deduction due to
the release of the power of appointment4 and asserted a federal tax de-
ficiency. The executor filed a petition in the Tax Court for a redetermina-
tion of the deficiency.
While this action was pending in the Tax Court, the trustee, who was
also the executor of the estate, brought an action in the New York Supreme
Court for a settlement of his account as trustee. As a part of this account-
ing, a determination of the validity of Mrs. Bosch's attempted release was
requested and the state court held it to be a nullity. Three briefs were filed
in the state action, all arguing that the release was a nullity.' The trustee
conceded that the New York proceeding was instituted "at least in part
for the purpose of affecting the outcome of the case before the Tax Court."
The Commissioner conceded that the state court decree might be final as
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041 (a) (1). It should be noted that this was a power created
before October 21, 1942.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5).
aINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a).
The value of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of
the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest in property which
passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to the extent
that such interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate.
' In order for the trust to qualify for the marital deduction it would have to vest in the wife
sufficient control of the trust property. If the release of the power of appointment was valid
there would be no control over the trust property and the marital deduction would fail. To avoid
this result the suit in the state court was instituted.
2 The three briefs were filed by the trustee, Mrs. Bosch, and a guardian ad litem for a relative
of Mr. Bosch, the only remainderman to take a position. The Second Circuit opinion in Bosch con-
ceded that "no argument for the validity of the release was presented to the court;" in fact, as the




to the parties, but he contended that it was not binding on the Tax Court
and that the Tax Court should independently construe the New York
statute. The Tax Court, however, chose to accept this state court decision
as to the validity of the release and did not attempt to interpret the New
York law applicable to the release of powers of appointment. The Com-
missioner appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed since the New York judg-
ment, rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over parties and subject
matter, authoritatively settled the rights of the parties not only for New
York but also for the application to those rights of the relevant provisions
of federal tax laws. Held, reversed: Where the federal estate tax liability
turns upon the character of a property interest held and transferred by
the decedent under state law, federal authorities are bound only by a
determination of such property interest by the highest state court. Com-
missioner v. Estate of Bosch, 35 U.S.L.W. 4542 (U.S. June 6, 1967).
II. STATUS OF THE BINDING-EFFECT THEORY BEFORE BOSCH
The weight to be given to any state court adjudication of property
rights rests on the premise that under the federal system the state law
determines property rights.! However, the effect of a state court interp-
retation of state law regarding the property in question is often uncer-
tain. To be given any effect at all the state court must be one of proper
jurisdiction7 and the decision must be binding on all the parties to the
action.! If these conditions are not met, the Tax Court has a duty to
ascertain independently the applicable state law and to apply it to the
rights involved Moreover, and the most important consideration in Bosch,
a state court adjudication is not binding on the federal court if the state
court proceeding was collusive.'"
Three Supreme Court decisions potentially on point,1' all in the 1930's,
'MERTEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 61.03, at 4 (1964 and 1967 Supp.). This is not to
be confused with the rule that for purposes of the interpretation of federal statutes, local law is
not controlling unless the federal statute "by express language or necessary implication, makes its
own operation dependent upon state law." Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942); Lyeth v.
Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194 (1938); Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 279 (1938); and Burnet v.
Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932). In a fact situation as was present in Bosch, the state court de-
cision has no res judicata effect upon the federal courts, Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 43
(1934); Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955). Clearly a decision in the state court
could not be binding on the Commissioner, as he was not a party to the action, RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942).
7 Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955); Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d
Cir. 1955); Goodwin's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953). MERTEN, FED-
ERAL GIFT & ESTATE TAXATION § 10.11 (1959 and 1965 Supp.).
"Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Babcock's Estate v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 837
(3d Cir. 1956); Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955); Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d
218 (3d Cir. 1955). MERTEN, FEDERAL GIFT & ESTATE TAXATION § 10.12 (1959 and 1965 Supp.).
'MERTEN, FEDERAL GIFT & ESTATE TAXATION § 10.13 (1959 and 1965 Supp.).
'
01Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934); Old
Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Farish,
360 F.2d $95 (5th Cir. 1966); Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 908 (1964); Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1964); Peyton's Estate
v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963); Darlington's Estate v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d
693 (3d Cir. 1962); Faulkerson's Estate v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 887 (1962); In re Sweet's Estate, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878
(1956); Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955). 5 P-H 1967 FED. TAX SERV. 5 41,110.
"Sharp v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 624 (1938); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937);
Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
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considered only whether or not the state court decision determined the
property rights involved and never set a standard for determining collu-
sion. For a period of time following the Supreme Court decisions there
was little litigation in this area; however, since the middle 1950's an in-
creasing number of federal courts have faced the problem of collusive state
suits in tax controversies. These recent cases have varied greatly in result,
thus leaving a discrepancy in the various circuits.
Several circuits have found the state court adjudication to be collusive
merely because the contest was non-adversary."2 On the other hand, both
the Third and Eighth Circuits have held that the non-adversary character
of the state proceeding is not in itself sufficient to defeat use of its result in
the federal courts but is merely relevant evidence to be considered in the
question of collusion.la The Third Circuit has frequently refused to find
collusion in the absence of actual fraud or improper conduct.' A few
courts considered the correctness of the state court decision in determining
collusiveness." However, there was authority that the correctness of the
state court adjudication should not be a factor since such adjudication, for
state court purposes, is conclusive of the property rights of the parties
involved." Another factor considered was whether the federal tax authori-
ties were notified of the action. 7
A subjective element often considered by the circuit courts was the tax-
payer's motive in instituting the state court proceeding." The Sixth Cir-
"Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1964);
Stallworth's Estate v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1958); Merchant's Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1957); In re Sweet's Estate, 234 F.2d 401
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956); Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955);
Wolfsen v. Smyth, 223 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1955); Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953). There has been no clear definition of a non-adversary
proceeding, but it would seem that unless both sides of an issue were presented and the issue intel-
ligently decided, there could be no adversary character. Merchant's Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1957), stated that whether or not a proceeding was ad-
versary was a fact question to be ascertained from all the circumstances surrounding the proceeding.
A non-adversary proceeding should be distinguished from the consent decree which is a decree
entered upon what is admittedly the agreement of the parties. A consent decree may be accepted
if not collusive. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. §§ 20.2053-1(b)(2), 20.2056(e)-2(d)(2) (1954). See also
Braverman & Gerson, The Conclusiveness of State Court Decrees in Federal Tax Litigation, 17
TAX L. REV. 545, 566 (1962).
"aPeyton's Estate v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963); Gallagher v. Smith, 223
F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955); 5 P-H 1967 FED. TAX SERV. 5 41,110; MERTEN, FEDERAL GIFT &
ESTATE TAXATION § 10.17 (1959 and 1965 Supp.).
"4Darlington's Estate v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1962); Babcock's Estate v.
Commissioner, 234 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1956); Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955);
Sharpe v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d 13 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 665 (1939).
'" Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1964); Peyton's Estate v. Commissioner,
323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963). See also 26 C.F.R. § 20.2053-1(b)(2) (1954).
" Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955); Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d
63 (8th Cir. 1952); Weyenberg v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Wisc. 1955).
" Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1964); Peyton's Estate v. Commissioner,
323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963). However, this is probably of little significance since the Internal
Revenue Service has a policy not to intervene in such suits and to move to dismiss if made a party.
Mim. 6134 (1947), 6 CCH 1966 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5 5781.4192; MERTEN, FEDERAL GIFT
& ESTATE TAXATION § 10.20 (1959 and 1965 Supp.). See also Harrar, The 'Collusive' State Decree;
A Nullity in Determining Federal Tax Consequences?, 21 J. TAXATION 372 (1964).
Is Sacks, The Binding Effect of Nontax Litigation in State Courts, N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON FED.
TAX 277, 295 (1963) (collusion-for the sole and single purpose of defeating the federal tax im-
posed); Braverman & Gerson, The Conclusiveness of State Court Decrees in Federal Tax Litigation,
17 TAX L. REV. 545, 576 (1962) (when the decree appears to serve no purpose other than to avoid
federal taxation, the decree should not be regarded as determinative of state law property rights);
MERTEN, FEDERAL GIFT & ESTATE TAXATION § 10.15 (1959 and 1965 Supp.).
NOTES
cuit has recently held the proceeding collusive if "the motive of avoiding
tax liability to the federal government so dominates over the usual interest
of the parties in protecting their own interests in property as to overturn
what would otherwise be the result of such litigation under applicable
state law."' 9 This view was echoed by the Seventh Circuit.' The United
States Supreme Court in dicta in Freuler v. Helvering defined collusion as
a situation where "all the parties joined in a submission of the issues and
sought a decision which would adversely affect the Government's right to
additional . . . tax."'" This definition has not been followed, thus allow-
ing the confusion among the circuits.
The Second Circuit Opinion As Judge Friendly pointed out in his dis-
sent, the Second Circuit in Bosch has chosen to follow the lead of the Third
Circuit2 by applying the state court result if no fraud or improper conduct
was involved. In refusing to find collusion because of non-adversity, the
court stated that it was not deciding "whether the federal court is 'bound
by' the decision of the state tribunal but whether or not a state tribunal
has authoritatively determined the rights under state law of a party to the
federal action."'2 The distinction seems illusory since such rights under state
law, if honored, are conclusive of the outcome in the tax case. Surely the
court was not suggesting that a federal court may, in its discretion, choose
to adopt the state court decree at any time. With no standards at all to be
applied, a party could never be sure of the outcome in a federal case.
Although pointed out in the dissent, the taxpayer's motive was not dis-
cussed by the majority. Under facts similar to those in Bosch where the
taxpayer admitted that the proceeding was instituted "at least in part for
the purpose of affecting the outcome of the case before the Tax Court,"
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits would have disregarded the state court
decree as collusive.' The Bosch court's finding of no collusion illustrates
the conflicting criteria among the circuits and the uncertain result when
state decrees are to be considered.
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION IN BOSCH
The Supreme Court in Bosch has finally settled the long standing prob-
lem of the effect to be given a state court adjudication in federal tax mat-
ters. In holding that the decree of any court lower than the highest court
of the state can never be binding in federal tax matters, the Supreme
Court has applied the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins25 since
"the underlying substantive rule involved is based on state law and the
state's highest court is the best authority on its own law."'" Previously
"Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1966).
20Faulkerson's Estate v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887
(1962). See also Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934).
22291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934).
" Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
23363 F.2d 1009, 1013 (2d Cir.), rev'd 35 U.S.L.W. 4542 (U.S. June 6, 1967).
24 See text accompanying notes 19, 20 supra.
25304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 35 U.S.L.W. at 4545.
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the Erie doctrine was not thought applicable to the "binding-effect" prob-
lem since Erie involves a determination of whether federal as opposed to
state law should apply and not whether a state court decision fixing
property rights was binding on the federal court." Under the Bosch doc-
trine if there is no decision by the highest court, federal authority must
apply what it finds to be the state law after giving proper regard to rele-
vant rulings of other courts of the state. In this respect it can be said
to be sitting as a state court. Thus it appears that a determination of
property rights by less than the highest state court can never be binding
on the federal court but is considered only another lower state court
opinion to which "proper regard" is to be given."
The Bosch opinion, based on an analysis of legislative history and the
Rules of Decision Act,2 ' did not discuss the factors previously thought to
be controlling,0 but rather extended the Erie doctrine from diversity cases
to federal tax questions. This extension to non-diversity cases is not unique,
since writers have stated that the Erie doctrine applies, whatever the ground
for federal jurisdiction, to any issue or claim which has its source in
state law.2' In fact, one Second Circuit case, Maternally Yours, Inc. v.
Your Maternity Shop, Inc.," applied Erie in a non-diversity case involv-
ing common law trademarks.
However, as Justice Harlan points out in his dissent, "it is difficult to
see why Erie is necessarily applicable without modification in all situa-
tions in which federal courts must ascertain state law."' Indeed in tax
controversies where precisely the legal and factual circumstances have
already been litigated in the state court it seems wasteful to rule that
the state court proceeding can never be controlling under any circum-
stances. Such a result seems to be contrary to the theory that unnecessary
litigation should be avoided.
Although the effect this decision will have on state-federal law rela-
tionships remain to be seen, it is obvious that, as Justice Harlan states in his
dissent, the "result might be widely destructive of both the proper rela-
tionship between state and federal law and the uniformity of the ad-
ministration of law within a state."" A situation could surely be imagined
27See the Second Circuit opinion in Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1013 (2d Cir. 1966) on this point.
See also Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80 (1940) (If the case were here on application of local
law under the rule of Erie we would not be inclined to disturb that finding. But it is not. Here
respondent is seeking to escape one of the normal incidents of the federal income tax.). Cf. Dayton
& Mich. v. Comm., 112 F.2d 627, 630 (4th Cir. 1940).
2 However, there is a line of cases that have held that a federal court is obligated to follow
the decision of a lower state court in the absence of decisions of the state supreme court showing
that the state law is other than announced by the lower court. Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
311 U.S. 464 (1940); West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Six Companies of
California v. Joint Highway District, 311 U.S. 180 (1940); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field,
311 U.S. 169 (1940). See 1A MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 0.307 [27] at 3302 (2d ed. 1965,
Supp. 1966).
2'28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
3" See discussion in Section II supra.
" IA MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.305 [3] at 3055 (2d ed. 1965, Supp. 1966); Maternally
Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956).
2234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956).
3335 U.S.L.W. at 4547.
"4 35 U.S.L.W. at 4548.
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